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Abstract
In my article I present a conceptual model of classifi cation of philosophical and theological concep-
tions of religion within Western philosophy and the Christian religious tradition. The model has 
four independent dimensions: the factual, the metaphysical, the ethical and the apophatic. The fi rst 
and the second dimensions are cognitive, while the third and the fourth are non-cognitive. The 
fourth dimension should not be identifi ed with the old tradition of apophatic theology because, ac-
cording to the model, the latter is a mixture of two (or even more) dimensions. The second part of 
my paper is devoted to the Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion developed by the members of the 
so-called Swansea School. My thesis is that, despite of their self-characterisation as philosophers, 
they present an extreme version of apophatic theology because their view on religion is, in the light 
of my conceptual model, one-dimensional.
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Th e four-dimensional model
The term “Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion” is not widely known, so it may 
be that I should start this paper with an explanation of it. However, I will begin with 
something a little different, namely with a conceptual model of classifi cation of phil-
osophical and theological conceptions of religion. It should be noted that the model 
I present is not designed (at least not primarily) for any sociological research on re-
ligiosity in any population, including the population of theologians and philosophers 
of religion. It is designed to classify theoretical systems, not people. The model has 
been formed in order to deal with the Christian theological systems and the Western 
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philosophies of religion, and its possible usability outside these fi elds is problematic; 
however, I do not rule it out. Many Western philosophers of religion like to speak 
about religiosity and faith in general, with very little to say about other (namely, 
non-Judeo-Christian) traditions and cultures. I share their ignorance, but I will try to 
avoid their hastiness. 
The model consists of four dimensions: the factual, the metaphysical, the ethical 
and the apophatic1. Each dimension represents a distinctive component of a theoreti-
cal system of religious beliefs. I assume the dimensions are independent in principle; 
however, I do not exclude the existence of linkages between them – say, the nega-
tive linkage between the factual and the apophatic dimension. The word “factual” 
indicates that, beside its geographical limitations just mentioned, the model also has 
some temporal limitations. For, as Alasdair MacIntyre famously said, “facts, like 
telescopes and wigs for gentlemen, were a 17th-century invention”2; there is no easy 
way to apply this concept to the ideas of the ancient Greeks, St. Augustine, or even 
Aquinas, and hence any attempt to deal with them using my model requires a sort of 
construction.
What do these dimensions mean? The fi rst of them, the factual, represents the set 
of beliefs that there is a causal connection between divinity and our well-known ma-
terial reality. I share MacIntyre’s view that our religious tradition and our philosophy 
of God is much older than the concept of fact (as well as the concept of factual causal-
ity), but once the latter had appeared it affected the common way of thinking about 
the former. The vast majority of religious Christians believe that God has the power 
to intervene in the realm of facts. The factual component is obviously involved in 
the popular belief in miracles. It is also present in the literal interpretation of Biblical 
cosmogony. There are many philosophical systems which approve this component, 
some of which seem to attach great importance to it3. There is also, of course, a great 
majority of Christian doctrines which contain it as well. Some of them may not stress 
it – the other components may be more important for them. But they usually entail 
a belief in at least one supernatural fact: the resurrection of Jesus Christ. I suppose 
that most Christians treat this belief as a necessary condition of being a Christian.
The second dimension, the metaphysical, represents beliefs built on one funda-
mental assumption regarding reality: it is not “fl at”, but hierarchically structured on 
1  Please note that my usage of the term “the apophatic” in this paper is customised. It does not cor-
respond fully to the meaning of the apophaticism of the Church Fathers, though I believe it grasps and 
puts emphasis on one component of their thought. The doctrine of, say, Pseudo-Dionysius, was a mixture 
of the metaphysical and the apophatic dimension in the sense of my model. The model has a predecessor 
which I have presented on several occasions in 2011. The previous version contained three dimensions, 
namely the empirical, the metaphysical and the spiritual. I decided to divide the last component due to 
my current belief that there is a non-cognitive aspect of religiosity which may have nothing in common 
with the ethical or moral issues. 
2  A. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Notre Dame, IN, 1989, p. 357.
3  Richard Swinburne, a widely known philosopher of religion at the Oxford University, may serve as 
a perfect example of a fact-focused thinker. See e.g.: R. Swinburne, The Existence of God, Oxford–New 
York 2004; also: R. Swinburne, Is There a God?, Oxford–New York 1996. Another example of such 
a thinker is Roger Trigg, whose Reason and Commitment was in its greater part devoted to the critique of 
the Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion. See: R. Trigg, Reason and Commitment, Cambridge 1973.
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at least two levels. The deeper, more important level (or levels) is called “the meta-
physical”. It is easy to note that this concept of the metaphysical also involves the
great 17th-century invention, the factual, as its reverse. The former is seen as
the foundation or basis of the latter. There may be some deep and mysterious kind of 
causal connection between them (which should not be confused with factual causal-
ity), and this kind of connection may be used to render the religious idea of creation. 
Some contemporary philosophers of religion make use of the old Platonic material/
ideal opposition, and others utilise the almost equally old Aristotelian-Thomistic sub-
stance/attribute scheme to express this intuition. There is a variety of attitudes taken 
by Christian doctrines towards the metaphysical component. Some of them, usually 
the new reformed churches, reject it. Others, like the mainstream theology of the 
Catholic Church, strongly accept it as a necessary requirement for self-understanding.
The third dimension, the ethical one, represents the stress on the ethical conse-
quences of religious teaching, the “ethical fruits”. I guess it is hard for most people 
(at least in Europe) to imagine any religious doctrine devoid of this dimension. (Note 
that I still refer to the theoretical content, leaving aside the problem of its practical 
appliance: the “ethical fruits” are beliefs about what one should do, a certain set of 
commandments nested in a religious tradition). It seems that it follows from the role 
of religion as the main “framework” organising human life. There are philosophical 
standpoints which put particular emphasis on the ethical function of religious faith. 
Richard Braithwaite, in his Empirist’s View of the Nature of Religious Belief, pointed 
this out as the main and only unproblematic component of religious tradition4. Braith-
waite himself belongs to the tradition of ethical reductionism in the philosophy of 
religion originated by Immanuel Kant. The late John Hick, a contemporary neo-Kan-
tian, in his idea of the Real stresses the ethical dimension, but mixes it with certain 
metaphysical beliefs5.
The fourth component is the most elusive one. In the fi rst approximation it repre-
sents the belief that God is beyond our perception, understanding and language. But 
my usage of the term requires further explanation. When I use the name “apophatic” 
to describe a distinct dimension in my model I make a conceptual shift. Traditionally, 
apophatic theology was always entangled with some metaphysical beliefs. (It was 
also usually linked with mysticism, but the issue of mysticism is beyond my scope 
here, as I am only considering the theoretical aspect of religious faith. When you try 
to look for a theory in mysticism, you always fi nd a mixture of metaphysical content 
and apophatic attitude.) My model leads to “distillation” of the negative content of 
the apophatic, since all the positive beliefs may fi nd their place in the metaphysical 
dimension6. 
It is not easy to fi nd thinkers and religious believers who deny the existence of the 
apophatic dimension of religious faith. The belief that God transcends our cognitive 
faculty (to a certain extent at least) is commonly accepted. However, some people 
4  Cf. R.B. Braithwaite, An Empirist’s View of the Nature of Religious Belief, Cambridge 1955.
5  Cf. J. Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths, Oxford 1973.
6  I thank Krzysztof Mech for his remark that I need to put this more plainly.
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seem to accept it rather grudgingly, and try to diminish its signifi cance7. I believe they 
are partly justifi ed in their reluctance. Just imagine a religious faith, then remove eve-
rything that can be told: the factual and metaphysical content disappears, as well as 
the ethical teaching. What is left? Mere pointless celebrations, empty shells of prac-
tices devoid of their meaning. The apophatic dimension may be seen as a destructive 
force, a power of negation which leads to a form of religiously decorated atheism8. It 
seems to be paradoxical to hold certain beliefs about God, like the belief in incarna-
tion for instance, and at the same time to claim that God is beyond our understanding.
However, the apophatic tradition in theology goes back to Neoplatonism, and is 
constantly present in Western culture. Although, as I mentioned above, the apophatic 
theology was always involved in the metaphysical dimension – in terms of my model 
– it obviously also contained the seed of the apophatic attitude. What is so attractive 
in this dimension of religious belief despite the danger it creates for the doctrine? 
Why take the risk of going into a paradox? Piotr Sikora expressed it brilliantly in his 
2004 book Słowa i zbawienie (Words and Salvation). He wrote:
Religious people who want to stay as they are cannot stop using the word “God”. The cult 
belongs to the essence of religion, and the attitude of worship requires the “object” of worship 
to be named if only to be focused somehow. On the other hand, the same attitude of worship 
requires the “object” worshipped to be worth of worship. It would not be worth of worship if 
it were less perfect than it is. But each object man can conceive is not worthy of absolute wor-
ship: since it does not transcend man absolutely, it would be more perfect. Hence, the religious 
believer cannot accept that God can be described adequately by the predicates formed by man9.
The apophatic dimension is open to draw extreme conclusions from. Since every 
single word is formed by man, including such words as “object”, “being”, and of 
course “God”, there is no word to say anything about God. There is no story about God
one can tell. And, since there is nothing to say about God, there is no fact about 
God and no metaphysical content either. As a matter of fact, there is no ethical con-
sequence either, since there is nothing one can draw any consequence from. The 
apophatic attitude brought to its extreme leaves us with nothing but ungrounded prac-
tices, celebrations and worship lacking its intention.
There are, of course, many philosophical and theological systems which include 
the apophatic component in a weaker form. I venture the claim that every deeply con-
sidered religious doctrine must develop this dimension to a certain extent. Christian 
denominations vary in this respect – it is said for instance that the Eastern Orthodox 
Church is more apophatic than the Roman Catholic Church – but most of them can 
share Sikora’s observation quoted above. Most contemporary philosophers of reli-
gion also endorse it. Hick, with his pluralistic theology, may again serve as a good 
example. By the way, the apophatic component, due to its tendency to negate or at 
least to sublate the factual or metaphysical content of a particular religious tradition, 
7  Such an attitude is exemplifi ed in my opinion by Swinburne. See footnote 3.
8  Karol Tarnowski emphasises this danger in several of his papers. Cf. K. Tarnowski, Wiara jako 
miejsce teologii negatywnej [in:] Tropy myślenia religijnego, Kraków 2009. 
9  P. Sikora, Słowa i zbawienie. Dyskurs religijny w perspektywie fi lozofi i Hilarego Putnama, Kra-
ków 2004, p. 242 (my translation).
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leads to the universalisation of this particular religious view, making it open for other 
traditions. Hence, I think, a bit of an apophatic attitude is necessary for inter-religious 
dialogue. 
The apophatic dimension may be present as a component of a complex religious 
system of beliefs, and may coexist with other dimensions within this system. Some-
times it is emphasised, and sometimes it is a less important feature of such a system. 
However, there are philosophical and religious views which are focused on the apo-
phatic dimension, understood in the extreme way which excludes the other dimen-
sions. It makes no sense to attribute such a view to Pseudo-Dionysius – the tradi-
tional Neoplatonic apophatic theology is more than one-dimensional according to my 
model. But I think I can give a perfect example of extreme apophatic thought. This is 
the Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion.
Th e Wittgensteinians
The Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion is not part of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
thought. It was the current of British analytic philosophy which emerged in the mid-
1950s, when the author of the Philosophical Investigations was already dead10. The 
spiritus movens of this movement was Rush Rhees, a pupil and close friend of Lud-
wig Wittgenstein, and also one of the editors of Wittgenstein’s posthumous works. 
The place of birth of the current was the Faculty of Philosophy (today non-existent) 
at University College of Swansea (today Swansea University) in Wales. This is why 
the Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion was dubbed the Swansea School. Rhees 
worked there as a lecturer between 1940 and 1966, when he retired. Among the other 
most important exponents of the Wittgensteinians based in Swansea were Peter G. 
Winch (a lecturer and a colleague of Rhees), and two of Rhees’s students: Roy F. 
Holland and Dewi Z. Phillips. Another close friend of Wittgenstein (and an impor-
tant American philosopher), Norman Malcolm, was also considered to be a member 
of the School due to the similarity of thought and long-time cooperation with the 
Swansea circle. These fi ve authors were also called the “Wittgensteinian fi deists”. 
This name is pejorative in intention. It was forged by the Canadian philosopher Kai 
Nielsen, a long-term critic and adversary of the ideas presented by Rhees and his 
friends. The Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion often declared self-restraint to 
fi deism and were sometimes disinclined towards Nielsen’s term11.
10  I am very far from the claim that there was no linkage between the thoughts of Wittgenstein and 
the ideas of the Wittgensteinians. This is obviously not the case, for the Wittgensteinian fi deism was 
based upon many Wittgenstein’s own remarks and conceptions regarding religion. Although the author 
of the Philosophical Investigations was not the only main source of inspiration for the Swansea School 
(the other source was Simone Weil), it can be said that Wittgenstein himself was a Wittgensteinian fi de-
ist in a sense. However, the current gained its shape, name and common recognition many years after 
Wittgenstein’s death.
11  See e.g.: D.Z. Phillips, Wittgenstein and Religion: Some Fashionable Criticisms [in:] K. Nielsen, 
D.Z. Phillips, Wittgensteinian Fideism?, London 2005, p. 41.
170
The grounds of the Swansea School outlook are a philosophy of language taken 
from the later Wittgenstein. Some undeveloped ideas of Wittgenstein’s regarding re-
ligious life, the meaning of the doctrinal content and worship, as well as the religious 
works of the French thinker Simone Weil were also the source of their inspiration. 
Note that both Wittgenstein and Weil referred to the Christian religion in the fi rst 
place. So the Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion focused mainly on Christianity 
and its troubles with the Western philosophy.
The “Wittgensteinian fi deism” fi rmly rejected any metaphysical or factual inter-
pretation of religious doctrines. They did not mean that the contents of the faith were 
irrelevant and – as a matter of fact – untrue stories12. Rather, they refused to treat 
them as any matter of fact, as descriptions of any factual or metaphysical reality. 
According to the Swansea School, the function of religious truths in believers’ lives 
is different, and much more signifi cant than the cognitive one13. Their function is to 
change the whole believer’s form of life (Lebensform – a quasi-technical term in the 
late philosophy of Wittgenstein).
This may suggest that the Wittgensteinians stressed the ethical dimension of re-
ligious faith, but this suggestion is wrong. They perceived ethics as independent of 
religion. Both Rhees and Phillips often underlined the difference between moral and 
religious duties, although they also admitted vital linkages. According to Rhees, re-
ligious faith resembles moral beliefs because the substantial content of the former is 
recognition of one’s own obligation towards God. However religious faith is different 
from morality, since God must not be understood as an invisible man14. It follows, 
therefore, that religious people have two separate areas of duties. This conclusion 
can be found in a couple of early papers by Phillips, where he claimed that morality 
can sometimes limit one’s religious obligations and that there are situations in which 
religion gives us no morally useful answers15. 
One may ask what the sense of religion is, and what the meaning of religious 
utterances is according to the Wittgensteinians. In my opinion this question fi nds 
its clearest answer in the works of Peter Winch. Winch, following Wittgenstein’s 
Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough16 and being focused on non-European religious 
traditions, stressed the practices and rituals involved in a given tradition. The rituals 
may seem to be “inconsistent” – just as Azande’s practices of witchcraft – but as far 
as they work within a community and regulate people’s everyday life they are all 
12  This standpoint has been taken by Richard Braithwaite in his essay. See footnote 4.
13  Cf. e.g.: R. Rhees, Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy, D.Z. Phillips, M. von der Ruhr (eds.), 
Cambridge 1997, p. 44–46; R.F. Holland, Religious Discourse and Theological Discourse, “Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy” 1953, Vol. 34, No. 3, p. 147.
14  Cf. R. Rhees, op.cit., p. 53. 
15  Cf. e.g.: D.Z. Phillips, Moral and Religious Conceptions of Duty: An Analysis [in:] Faith and Phi-
losophical Enquiry, London 1970, p. 191–197; D.Z. Phillips, God and Ought [in:] Faith and Philosophi-
cal Enquiry, p. 223–232; D.Z. Phillips, On The Christian Concept of Love [in:] Faith and Philosophical 
Enquiry, p. 233–254.
16  L. Wittgenstein, Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough [in:] Philosophical Occasions 1912–1951, 
J.C. Klagge, A. Nordmann (eds.), Indianapolis (IN) 1993.
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right17. The strength of religious practices has nothing to do with the credibility of 
their “conceptual” or “propositional” content. All that matters is how deeply rooted 
they are in the community’s form of life. It can be noted that the idea of the possible 
confl ict between religious and moral duties does not emerge from the perspective 
of Winch. But one should not conclude that Winch disagreed with Rhees and Phil-
lips about this point. They all underlined the contingency of particular cultural and 
religious traditions. So, they might claim that our own tradition – due to its unique 
history – makes room for religious independent moral criteria, which serve as limita-
tions to religious duties, while such room may not exist within other traditions (like 
that of Azande).
Phillips’s later view on Christianity endorsed a much more complicated relation-
ship between religion and morality. According to him the ethical perspective was 
a kind of prerequisite of religious faith. One must have a moral sense to see the evil 
in the world, and this enables one to be a true Christian. Christianity is a response for 
the fact of moral contingency of the world. But it is not the only possible response. 
Phillips does not mean that the moral sense automatically pushes one to believe in 
(the Christian) God. The fact of moral chaos of the world can also lead one to athe-
ism. In other words, a true (Christian) believer will be a moral person, but morality 
appears independently and before one’s religious belief, and does not follow from it. 
Nor must religion follow from the moral sense18.
The Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion saw their task in applying the thera-
peutic process ordinated by Wittgenstein to religious faith and its understanding. The 
goal of the process was to cleanse the language of faith (as well as the language about 
faith) of confusing and vague elements. These confusing and vague elements had two 
main sources. The fi rst was ancient philosophy. The fi rst Church Fathers undertook 
the defence of their beliefs in terms of their intellectual adversaries – this is how the 
apologetics emerged. The Swansea School seemed to accept this activity as long as 
Christian thinkers simply defended their faith. But, with time, the terms of being, 
cause, soul or substance, taken from Greek and Roman philosophers, came into the 
inner discourse of Christianity. The terms became intellectual tools for the believers’ 
own needs and started to be used in interpretations of faith within Christian communi-
ties. All this – according to Rhees and his friends – resulted in many ambiguities and 
mistakes. The doctrine of faith became a mosaic of what made sense and what made 
just an illusion of sense, and the authentic Christian spirituality slowly transformed 
into a mere superstition. Once the alien language of philosophy had been given the 
permission to impose its own semantic structures on the language of Revelation, the 
latter began to lose its meaning and its original identity. 
The second source of ambiguities in the religious language was, as the mem-
bers of the Swansea School claimed (strictly following Wittgenstein on this point19), 
17  Cf. P.G. Winch, Understanding a Primitive Society, “American Philosophical Quarterly” 1964, 
No. 1 (1964), p. 307–324. 
18  Cf. e.g. D.Z. Phillips, The Problem of Evil and The Problem of God, Minneapolis (MN) 2005,
p. 175.
19  Cf. L. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, transl. P.G. Winch, G.H. von Wright, H. Nyman (eds.), 
Chicago 1984, p. 72.
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the fear for one’s own existence. This fear leads to what Rhees ironically called the 
“popular religion”. The “popular religion” brings a vision of life after death which is 
to dismiss the fear of death, and a vision of Divine Providence understood as an effec-
tive force infl uencing the individual lives which is to dismiss the fear of misfortune. 
It is, fi rst of all, this fear which degenerates Christianity and reduces it to a bundle of 
superstitious beliefs. It is superstitious to understand Salvation as a happy-go-lucky 
“life after death” and God as the all-powerful ruler of the factual reality20.
The Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion claimed that Christianity, when un-
derstood rightly, is free from both sources of confusions: the fear and the philosophy. 
It does not need a pseudo-substantial promise of future life, and it does not appeal to 
dreadful imaginations of perennial punishment and hellfi re. It is far from taking the 
soul as a thing existing in time or imperishable, as well as from thinking about God 
as an omnipotent being. “True faith”, according to Phillips, understands the soul as 
a relation of man to God, and understands the belief in God as one of the possible 
reactions to the moral chaos of the world. “God is Love” should be the key to the 
reality of God for every true Christian21.
Conclusion
The Wittgensteinians never thought of themselves as theologians; neither did they 
ever consider themselves apophatics. Their self-consciousness is probably the weak-
est point of their doctrine. They never admitted they had a doctrine in the fi rst place. 
They thought they had just clarifi ed the real sense of Christianity, the real meaning 
of Christians’ utterances. However, their work, in my opinion, is rather a redefi nition 
of Christian faith according to a few general intuitions they took from Wittgenstein 
and Weil. The intuitions say, for instance, that God cannot be known or understood 
in the usual meaning of these terms, that true religion has nothing in common with 
the fear of death, that religious beliefs have practical and not theoretical goals; they 
do not describe anything. 
I take these intuitions as strictly apophatic: they led the Wittgensteinian philoso-
phers of religion to create an extreme version of one-dimensional apophatic theology, 
not a philosophy. They paid full attention to the apophatic dimension and denied the 
religious nature of the other three dimensions. The factual and the metaphysical di-
mensions were rejected as superstitious; the ethical dimension was seen as independ-
ent of religion (though not unrelated).
20  Cf. e.g. R.F. Holland, op.cit., p. 151–154.
21  Cf. D.Z. Phillips, op.cit., p. 199–201.
